The European Social Model: Lessons for Developing Countries by Lindbeck, Assar


















Working Paper No. 581, 2002 
 
The European Social Model: Lessons for Developing Countries 
 




















IUI, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
P.O. Box 5501 
SE-114 85 Stockholm  
Sweden                  
 
         
The European Social Model:  







Institute for International Economic Studies 
Stockholm University 








Developing countries, in particular the least developed ones, probably have more to 
learn from social policies in Europe during the early 20
th century than from the 
elaborate welfare-state arrangements after World War II. In addition to macro-
economic growth and stability, the main ambitions must  be to fight human 
deprivation, including illiteracy, malnutrition, poor access to water and sanitation – 
and, in some cases, also weak, incompetent and/or corrupt governments. It is also 
important that informal systems in the fields of transfers and social services are not 
destroyed when developing countries embark on more formal systems in these fields 
in the future. The European experience also warns against the creation of social 
systems that are so generous that disincentives, moral hazard and receding  social 
norms seriously distort the national economy, including the labor market. 
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1  General Lessons 
 
In the early 20
th century, many European countries still relied heavily on the family 
both for income protection and personal (“human”) services, such as child care and 
care for the elderly, and, to some extent, also for health care. Civil society, including 
so-called “friendly societies”, also contributed to income insurance, for instance in 
connection with sickness, old age, and unemployment (the latter often with the help of 
union-run insurance systems). Occupational pensions also played an important part 
for government employees. Besides this, government-created social arrangements 
consisted mainly of selective poverty relief (social assistance) and basic services in 
the fields of elementary education and health. In the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, 
legislation was, however, also introduced for work injury compensation and basic, 
though quite modest (lump-sum or means-tested) pensions. In some countries, mainly 
on the European continent, the government was also involved in the organization of 
occupational pensions in the private sector, primarily in the case of large industrial 
firms. 
Comprehensive systems for income maintenance￿in the case of childbirth, 
single motherhood, unemployment, sickness, old age, etc.￿were not introduced in 
Western Europe (henceforth “Europe”) until the first decades after World War II, 
however. Secondary and tertiary mass education and comprehensive health care for 
the entire population were built up at about the same time. It is thus only from the 
1960s and 1970s that it makes sense to talk about a “welfare state” in Europe. In other 
words, Europe was already quite rich, as compared to most contemporary developing 
countries, when elaborate welfare-state arrangements were created.  
Since welfare-state arrangements differ among European countries, talking 
about a common “European social model” is somewhat misleading. Naturally, this 
observation constitutes the background to the habit among scholars to classify 
European countries in terms of different “welfare regimes.” The most important 
difference among countries probably concerns the relative role of the state, the family, 
and the market for the provision of income protection and social services. Countries 
also differ in terms of the relative roles of “universal” benefits tied to citizenship, 
occupational benefits tied to work, and selective means-tested income support. There 
is also a considerable difference in the generosity of benefits and welfare services. 3
 
As a result of the far-reaching social reforms after World War II, the social 
arrangements in Europe are today clearly more comprehensive than in other parts of 
the world. The  achievements of these arrangements are well known: high-income 
security for the individual over the life cycle, considerably mitigated poverty, and 
ample provision of various types of social services. The weaknesses of these social 
arrangements are also well known today. It turned out that some of these 
arrangements were not very financially robust to various types of shocks, for instance, 
in terms of demography, productivity growth, and macroeconomic disturbances. The 
architects of the welfare state also neglected, or at least underestimated, undesirable 
behavior adjustments in response to changes in economic incentives, as a result of 
explicit and implicit marginal tax wedges and “moral hazard” in connection with 
various benefit systems.  
What, then, are the general lessons for developing countries of social policies in 
Europe? These countries, in particular the least developed ones, probably have more 
to learn from social policies in Europe during the early 20
th century than from the 
elaborate welfare-state arrangements after World War II. The reason is, of course, that 
economic resources, socioeconomic structures, and informal welfare arrangements in 
the earlier period were more similar to the situation in today’s developing countries 
than contemporary conditions. In most developing countries, trying to imitate 
contemporary welfare-state arrangements in Europe would be a serious mistake. In 
particular, this would be the case for transfer payments designed to provide protection 
against income losses for the population as a whole, since such protection is very 
expensive and also requires a highly developed administration. Instead, it is 
reasonable to give priority to the creation of an environment conducive to 
entrepreneurship, long-term economic growth, basic health and primary and (at least 
in some developing countries) secondary education￿as was the case in Europe a 
century ago. The “fine tuning” of welfare-state arrangements in Europe today are 
often far from what is needed in developing countries. We have also learned how 
important macroeconomic stability is for social conditions. In addition to 
macroeconomic growth and stability, the main ambitions must be to fight human 
deprivation, including illiteracy, malnutrition, poor access to water and sanitation, 
and, in some cases, also weak, incompetent, and/or corrupt governments. 4
 
It is also important to look at social policies in a broad context, and then identify 
the interaction among different types of economic and social variables. Myrdal (1944, 
appendix 3) often emphasized processes of “cumulative causation”, with vicious 
circles among various poverty-creating forces: malnutrition damaging health, which 
in turn results in social exclusion and reduces the possibilities of acquiring education, 
which further lowers productivity and political influence, which goes back to square 
one by exacerbating malnutrition and social exclusion, etc. Dynamic processes of this 
type are well understood today among professional observers of poverty in deve-
loping countries. It is equally important to understand such processes when we try to 
turn vicious circles into virtuous ones. 
There are, of course, other important similarities among developing countries 
than their poverty. Most of these countries are also rural, and they have a young popu-
lation. It is, however, also important to emphasize their  differences in terms of 
socioeconomic conditions, administrative capacities, the role of informal welfare 
arrangements and economic and social  policies. Presumably, the most important 
difference is the level of development and the degree of “modernization” which, to a 
considerable extent, is a result of the governments’ past emphasis on, or neglect of, 
long-term economic growth. For instance, governments and ethnic and social groups 
in some developing countries, not least in Africa, have clearly been more engaged in 
power struggles and rent seeking than in growth enhancing policies. In several South 
East Asian countries, by contrast, it is fair to say that concern for economic growth 
has indeed dominated, also over issues of income security. As we know, this has been 
reflected in a heavy emphasis on capital formation. Some of these countries have, 
however, also succeeded in combining fast economic growth with a fairly even 
distribution of income and wealth, thanks to early land reform and widespread 
elementary education. The emphasis on economic growth also shows up in the 
composition of infrastructure investment, which has been heavily concentrated on 
production-oriented structures such as harbors and roads and railways, rather than 
facilities directly servicing households, such as housing, sanitation and the 
environment in cities and the countryside. This emphasis on growth, of course, 
reflects a n understanding among policymakers that mass poverty can never be 
replaced by mass affluence without sustained economic growth during many decades. 
This said, we should not forget that some social arrangements, not just spending 
on primary education, might be conducive to long-term economic growth, the most 5
 
important examples perhaps being policies improving the nutrition status and the 
general health conditions of the poor, in particular children. Safety nets and systems 
for income protection may also, up to a point, be conducive to economic efficiency, 
since they may enhance political and social stability (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). But, 
in particular, we have learned over the years that highly selective social policies can 
make a big difference in the living conditions among the poorest sections of a society, 
also at a given level of per capita GDP (Sen 1983).  
I argued above that it is mainly the European experience of social policies 
before World War II, and even before World War I, that should be of interest for 
social policies in today’s developing countries. For the more affluent ones, however, 
there are also lessons to be learned from the contemporary experience of social 
policies in developed countries. For other developing countries, the European 
experience after World War II is probably of interest mainly for contemporary 
discussions of social policies far ahead in the future. The latter observation is of some 
importance since it often takes a long time before social policy arrangements are in 
place  and functioning properly. An extreme example is funded social insurance 
systems, including so-called provident funds à la Malaysia and Singapore, since such 
systems mature very slowly. However, the most important message of the paper for 
developing countries is probably to avoid destroying existing informal systems. 
Empirical research suggests that these risks are real (Townsend 1994, Udry 1994). 
I will organize my discussion as a “sightseeing tour” in the welfare landscape, 




2  Childhood 
 
Before World War II, the family and other relatives were in charge of most child care 
in Europe, though high- and middle-class families also hired helpers (usually girls) in 
the market. The main example of government intervention was mandatory and 
subsidized primary education. After World War II, three additional government 
interventions were launched, or greatly expanded: prenatal care, income transfers (or 
tax deductions) to families with children and, in some countries, also subsidized child 6
 
care outside the family either in institutions (kindergarten) or in the homes of others 
(family daycare). 
It is generally agreed that the sharp drop in birth rates during the last two 
decades threatens the financial viability of various welfare-state arrangements in the 
long run. An obvious policy response would be to stimulate child bearing by 
redistributing income to families with children, in particular those with many 
children. Somewhat surprisingly, this has, so far, not occurred to any large extent, 
perhaps because families with children are today a highly heterogeneous minority 
among voters.  
There are, however, at least two arguments for more interventionist policy 
measures in the case of families with children. First, there is a second-best argument 
to subsidize child care outside the family, because of the existence of distortionary 
taxes favoring tax-free household work at the expense of taxed work in the labor 
market. Indeed, government policies in the Nordic countries have recently followed 
this second-best route through strong subsidies of child care outside the family, which 
is one important explanation for the high labor force participation of women in these 
countries.  
The other argument for government intervention in the lives of families with 
small children is, of course, that schooling has important implications for economic 
efficiency and the future distribution of factor income. It is controversial whether the 
same argument is relevant for child care of preschool children. In the case of poor 
families with little education, in particular families with severe social problems, it is, 
however, widely believed that child care outside the family enhances human capital 
formation and hence the future factor income of such children. This, of course, is the 
traditional “head-start” argument.  
Is any of this relevant for developing countries? The fertility problem is, of 
course, usually the reverse of the European one; about 40 per cent of the population in 
many developing countries are children. It is, however, hazardous (to say the least) to 
use this observation as an argument for turning the policy recommendation for Europe 
upside down for developing countries, hence recommending redistributions of income 
to the disadvantage of families with (many) children! We probably have to rely on 
                                                                                                                                            
1For a more detailed account of the role of welfare state arrangements over the individual’s life cycle, 
though without discussion of the lessons for developing countries, see Lindbeck (2002). 7
 
traditional birth control policies and compulsory education to convince families in 
developing countries to restrict their number of children.  
As in Europe before World War II, it is natural to expect that child care in 
developing countries, for a long time to come, will be pursued by the family and other 
relatives￿combined with privately hired helpers in the case of high- and middle-class 
families. The most urgent policy interventions in child raising in developing countries 
must be improved nutrition, fights against infective diseases for pregnant woman and 
small children, and primary education. The relevant methods are commonplace: 
information about high-nutrition food intake, subsidies of such food for the poorest 
section of the population, obstetric care, clean water, sanitation, immunization, and 
subsidized compulsory primary education. Indeed, studies in medicine and bio-
demography have shown the importance of these factors for the physical and 
intellectual development of children (Behrman 1993, Scrimshaw 1996, United 
Nations 1997). In particular, the  interaction between infectious diseases and 
malnutrition for children has turned out to be highly damaging; deficiencies in these 
respects are even transmitted to grandchildren. Usually, such policies are not very 
expensive as compared to many other types of government spending, for example 
infrastructure investment and military spending. It is also an area where technical and 
economic assistance from the outside world may be particularly useful. The head-start 
argument for childcare outside the biological family is probably relevant mainly for 
orphans and street children in developing countries.  
What about  education? In the poorest developing countries, there are both 
efficiency and distributional reasons to concentrate educational resources on primary 
schooling, as was the case in Europe during the first decades of the 20
th century. 
There is, however, also an emerging consensus that a number of developing countries, 
for instance in Southeast Asia and Latin America, have reached a level of 
development where it is appropriate to allocate more resources to secondary and 
tertiary education. European experiences during the 20
th century suggest that it then 
makes sense to put a strong emphasis on a combination of theoretical and vocational 
training  – along the lines of the apprenticeship systems inAustria, Germany, and 
Switzerland. These countries have been successful both in creating a skillful labor 




3  Income and job security during working age 
 
Only very few policy interventions directly designed to enhance income security and 
job security existed in Europe before the 1930s; modest unemployment benefits and 
limited public works programs during depressions being the main exceptions. Two 
reasonable explanations are perhaps that the main beneficiaries of such policies had 
little political power and that macroeconomic theories for rationalizing such policies 
did not exist before the “Keynesian revolution.” 
By contrast, macroeconomic policies have dominated the political agenda in 
Europe after World War II. Such policies were also quite successful for a while in the 
sense that the macroeconomic performance in Europe was excellent from the 
economic recovery during the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. The subsequent situation 
may be characterized as a continuation of good income security combined with dismal 
employment performance and hence, deteriorating job security for part of the labor 
force. An appropriate policy package to improve employment performance would 
have to include not only measures strengthening the attractiveness of outsiders in the 
labor market and activating their job search, but also measures reducing the market 
powers of insiders (Lindbeck 1996). 
What are the lessons, if any, for developing countries from the experience of 
employment policies and income protection in Europe? In most developing countries, 
unemployment benefits hardly exist, simply because some 60-80 percent of the 
population are in informal sectors (largely agriculture). In some of the more affluent 
developing countries, certain unemployment benefits do exist, but these are usually 
neither comprehensive nor generous. In some of the most advanced developing 
countries, including some countries in East Asia, there is, however, a quite detailed 
labor market legislation, including both minimum wages and job security legislation. 
But the implementation of the laws is usually weak or even nonexistent, which is, of 
course, a disadvantage for employees who would keep their jobs also with stricter 
implementation. However, poor implementation is an advantage for workers who 
would not have been hired if minimum wages and job security legislation had been 
strictly enforced.  9
 
As a result of all this, European-type insider-outsider division has largely been 
avoided in developing countries, and highly persistent unemployment after negative 
macroeconomic shocks do not seem to be prevalent. There is, instead, often 
considerable segmentation between privileged employees in the public sector, and in 
some cases also in large firms, on the one hand, and less privileged employees in 
smaller firms, on the other hand.  
Moreover, some of the more affluent developing countries seem to be strongly 
exposed to negative macroeconomic shocks. This problem can probably be mitigated 
to some extent by floating exchange rates or, in some case, by membership in a large 
monetary union where the country’s trade is concentrated. Another macroeconomic 
problem is that both financial institutions and production firms have often neglected 
their balance sheets, which appears in low equity capital and much short-term 
borrowing (often also in the form of uncovered loans in foreign currencies). I 
understand this to have been an important factor behind the financial crisis in East 
Asia in the late 1990s. Tougher authorities in the field of financial inspection are thus 
called for. In view of the severe social problems in connection with recurring macro-
economic crises in developing countries, the first, and perhaps most important, line of 
defense for job and income security must be good macroeconomic institutions, well-
consolidated firms, and a reasonably good macroeconomic policy, including an 
appropriate exchange rate system. 
Sooner or later, the population in developing countries will certainly demand a 
second line of defense, in the form of income protection. It is well known that systems 
of unemployment insurance do not easily spontaneously emerge via voluntary market 
transactions due to problems of adverse selection. Either the state or unions must 
intervene to create comprehensive unemployment benefit systems. It is then, of 
course, important to realize that the generosity and the duration for the benefits must 
be kept within certain bounds to mitigate moral hazard problems. 
In countries with a particularly low per capita income and quite a small formal 
production sector, ethical considerations probably point to a safety net solution, rather 
than comprehensive unemployment insurance, designed to provide income protection 
in proportion to previous income. The purpose would be to secure elementary 
entitlements such as food, shelter, clothing, and basic health. Such safety nets could, 
of course, operate by quite different methods: public work programs; subsidized work 
in the private sector for unemployed workers; needs-based cash transfers (“social 10
 
assistance” or “welfare”) to poor people in general; selective transfers in kind (food 
programs such as food stamps); or subsidies to basic consumption. Administrative 
feasibility, including precision targeting, is presumably a crucial aspect in the choice 
of method.  
The administrative difficulties in running such programs in developing countries 
are accentuated by the problem of knowing when the family is able and willing to 
provide income security to its members and when this is not the case. There may be 
some experiences from Southern Europe, for example Italy, on how to handle, or not 
handle, safety nets in societies with weak government administration and frequent 
cohabitation of parents and adult children.  
 Moreover, considering the dominating role of agriculture in most developing 
countries, crop insurance programs are often more important than unemployment 
insurance. Local, so-called “micro- and area-based”, protection for small farmers is 
another example of income protection programs that should perhaps be relied on to a 




4  Sick-pay insurance and health care 
 
In Europe before World War II, personal savings, support from relatives and friends, 
and individual insurance schemes dominated as methods for mitigating economic 
setbacks in connection with health problems. Mandatory sick-pay insurance, usually 
administrated by government agencies, is basically a post World War II phenomenon. 
Since these systems are quite generous today, with replacement rates often in the 
interval of 70-100 percent, governments in Europe have no doubt succeeded in 
reallocating income to periods when the individual is temporarily sick, and hence to 
protect consumption during such periods. In a considerable part of Europe, sick-pay 
benefits, like unemployment benefits, are, however, tied to previous earnings, which 
favors individuals with stable employment. This means that the insider-outsider 
division of the labor market is transmitted to periods of bad health.  
In several European countries, the sick-pay insurance systems have recently run 
into serious financial difficulties. One reason is moral hazard, for instance, when an 11
 
individual calls sick when feeling tired on a Monday morning. The consequences of 
moral hazard may be accentuated by receding social norms against exploiting the 
systems, when individuals observe that others do this. To the extent that these factors 
explain the rising costs of sick-pay insurance, more waiting days, coinsurance, and 
stricter administration of the benefit system would be rational policy responses.  
 In some countries, including Sweden, higher costs for sick-pay insurance are, 
however, more related to long-term than to short-term sick leave. “Double work” by 
women is probably a reason, since they still do the bulk of household work, including 
child care in the home, simultaneously with work in the labor market. In this sense, 
women have paid a high psychological price for their increased labor market partici-
pation. There is also some speculation in the general discussion to the effect that 
reorganization of work, with increased requirements of efficiency and individual 
responsibility, has contributed to the stress at work.  
If these are important explanations, the problems might be mitigated both by 
improvements in the work environment and by a greater responsibility for household 
work, including child care, among men. The first may be achieved by experience-
rated insurance fees for firms (higher fees for firms with many sick days). It is more 
difficult to design policies that shift household work from women to men, since this 
would require that the government intervene in the lives of families. Such policies, 
however, already exist to some extent in Denmark and Sweden, since men are offered 
nontransferable rights to stay at home to take care of small children, without much 
loss of income.  
What about developing countries? In most of these, sick leave is basically 
financed as in Europe during the first decades of the 20
th century, i.e., via relatives 
and civil society. In countries with more formal systems of health insurance, i.e., 
mainly the most affluent among developing countries, these systems are usually 
highly fragmented, with separate arrangements for different industries, professions 
and firms. If more elaborate sick-pay insurances are created in developing countries in 
the future, the European experience illustrates the importance of watching out for 
moral hazard and changes in social norms. For that reason, it is important to keep the 
generosity of the system within bounds, and make the administrative controls tight, 
not least to prevent physicians from being overly generous in certifying the needs for 
sick leave. 12
 
What, then, is the experience of  health care services  in Europe? In general 
terms, the basic problem is how to combine insurance, incentives, and freedom of 
choice. All health care systems are today exposed to serious cost problems, since the 
“third party pays.” Insurance schemes, in particular when based on cost-plus financ-
ing, tend to generate particularly rapid increases in costs, which is strikingly 
illustrated by the experience in Germany and the United States. Canada has succeeded 
better in containing costs in its health care insurance systems by relying on fixed 
budgets for health providers and price control of services.  Tax-financed health 
services of the UK National Health Service (NHS) type have typically been better at 
containing health care costs. But this has been achieved by strict rationing, i.e., queues 
and waiting lists (which also is a problem in Canada), and high stress levels at work 
for the personnel.  
Are there any lessons for developing countries from health care in developed 
countries? Most well informed observers probably agree that it makes sense for 
developing countries to emphasize fights against infectious diseases and malnutrition, 
not least for pregnant women and small children. This may mean that comprehensive 
treatments of heart disease, cancer, and other ailments characteristic of a rich and 
aging population, would have to be postponed. Concretely, this means information 
and subsidies in the field of sanitation and primary health care and probably also 
information about the importance of a healthy life style, including less smoking. The 
surveillance of public and private health care units, with very uneven qualities, is also 
of potential importance. In a somewhat longer perspective, there are also strong cases 
for mandatory health insurance for “catastrophic health care”, co-payments, and the 
mobilization of  more resources for health care in the private sector. In many 
countries, it is also important to increase the salaries of doctors and nurses.  
Apart from this, it is important to allow and stimulate experimentation, which 
requires considerable freedom of  entry of nongovernment health providers￿for 
nonprofit as well as profit organizations. I then assume that it is better to allow 
decentralized experimentation, rather than keep existing systems intact or, as often 
occurs, have the government conduct full scale experiments for a whole country. It is 
also important to avoid destroying whatever nongovernment networks exist via 
families and civil society.
2 
                                                 
2 The role of such networks in developing countries is still an “under-researched” field. 13
 
 
5  Pensions and old-age care 
 
While mandatory pension systems in Europe have been instrumental for providing 
income security for the elderly, governments have played a much more modest role in 
the field of care for the elderly. As we know, both fields encounter serious problems 
today. To the extent that contemporary, and projected future, financial problems of 
the pension systems are caused by low birth rates in the past, conceivable remedies 
would be to boost nativity (with considerable time-lag before the size of the labor 
force is influenced) and encourage the immigration of young individuals of working 
age. Unfortunately, it is not obvious that governments can do much about birth rates 
(except perhaps provide good child care outside the family), and there may be “social 
limits” to immigration because of the risks of ethnical tensions in the countries of 
immigration. To the extent that financial problems for pension systems are related to a 
higher longevity of individuals after retirement, raising the statutory pension age and 
removing subsidies to early retirement are instead natural remedies. But to avoid 
heavy unemployment among the elderly in connection with later retirement, it is also 
important to allow greater flexibility in relative wages (for workers of different ages) 
and increase the possibilities for retirees to individually choose the length of their 
work week. 
It is today also increasingly understood in Europe that PAYGO (“pay-as-you-
go”) pension systems create disincentive problems for work via implicit tax wedges. 
The reason is, of course, that the link between the contributions and the subsequent 
pension benefits for the individual is usually quite weak. An obvious way of 
mitigating this incentive problem is to tighten the link, hence making the pension 
systems more actuarial, or “quasi-actuarial” (since the return on mandatory pension 
saving would be lower than the return in financial markets). There is also a case for a 
partial shift to a funded pension system. The individual then would be able to enjoy a 
more diversified portfolio of pension claims than in either a pure PAYGO system, 
where the (risky) return depends on the growth rate of the tax base, or a pure funded 
system where the (risky) return depends on developments in financial markets. The 
reason is, of course, that these two types of returns are not fully correlated, in 
particular if the pension funds invest in international capital markets. 14
 
What is the relevance of all this for the financing of retirement in developing 
countries? In most such countries, informal systems, in particular via relatives, are 
likely to dominate for a long time to come. Sooner or later, there will, however, be a 
strong ethical case for government intervention to mitigate poverty among the 
elderly￿an application of the safety net idea to the retirement period. A basic pension 
in the form of a lump sum payment, equal for all elderly, or means-tested pension 
benefits, are then obvious alternatives. This corresponds to the World Bank’s (1993) 
recommendation for a “universal first-tier pension.” An additional advantage of such 
a system, in principle, is that it is rather equitable if financed by tax payments that 
increase with income. But in many developing countries, only a few percent of the 
population pay income taxes, or can be exposed to payroll taxes, which, of course, 
means that the financing would be a serious administrative obstacle.  
In the long run, the expanding middle class will, however, hardly be satisfied 
with either a basic pension or means-tested pension benefits. This group is likely to 
ask for income protection in some proportion to previous income, as in today’s 
developed countries, partly in response to a gradually reduced importance of transfers 
within families. As we know, some developing countries have already started to build 
up mandatory pension systems of this type: funded systems in Chile and Malaysia and 
some other countries in Latin American; while Korea, Philippines, and Thailand have 
chosen social security systems. Advocates of mandatory, funded pension systems in 
developed countries have often referred to the importance of boosting aggregate 
national saving, which is easiest if a funded system is created “from scratch.” While 
the argument for such a boost may be important for some developing countries, it 
hardly has much strength in developing countries with high national saving rates, such 
as some countries in East Asia. 
In the future, when comprehensive pension systems probably will exist in 
today’s developing countries, the same financial problems as in today’s developed 
countries are likely to occur. Falling fertility and increased l ongevity seem to be 
inevitable developments in the modern world, and even the fastest growing countries 
will sooner or later experience slower productivity growth. In the few developing 
countries where formal pension systems already exist, the pension age is usually quite 
low (relative to life expectancy). Thus, there is great room for defending, or 
improving, the financial position of these systems by raising the retirement age, for 15
 
instance, from 55 to 67 or even 70. Some developing countries may also find it easier 
than many countries in Europe to accommodate the elderly in the labor market, since 
they have had arrangements for work for the elderly for a long time, and since relative 
wages are often more flexible than in Europe. It remains to be seen whether these 
conditions will prevail. 
Contemporary financial and organizational problems in the field of old-age care 
in developed countries are related to the demographic factors of the same type as 
those that have created problems for the pension system. The organizational difficul-
ties are instead rather similar to the problems of health care: it is difficult to combine 
solidarity-oriented financing with production efficiency and freedom of choice. Old-
age care is also hurt by Baumol’s Law (Baumol 1967), which explains why costs and 
prices tend to increase particularly fast in the case of labor intensive services like 
human care. Another issue concerns the freedom of choice of services for the elderly. 
Such freedom is, in principle, easy to bring about in the case of service in the elderly’s 
homes￿shopping, cooking, cleaning etc.￿like in child care and care for the elderly. 
Service checks (vouchers) are an obvious tool. Vouchers are less useful in the case of 
institutionalized old-age care, since the needs for medical care vary enormously 
among patients. Still it would certainly be possible to offer considerable freedom of 
choice of service institution for the elderly. 
It will take some time before most developing countries encounter similar pro-
blems, not only because the population is still young, but also because the family is 
likely to supply care services to the elderly for a long time to come. But it may be a 
good idea at least to start thinking, and perhaps also experimenting, with alternative 
systems of care for the elderly before there is an acute need to expand formal systems 
in this field. In the long run, it is not likely that family members and other relatives 
can be relied on to service the elderly any more in today’s developing countries than 
in Europe. 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
The experiences of social policies during the first decades of the 20
th century in 
Europe underline the important role of informal systems for income security and 
personal services at low levels of economic development. It is crucial, however, that 16
 
informal systems are not destroyed when developing countries embark on more 
formal systems in these fields in the future. I have also emphasized that the European 
experience warns against the creation of social systems that are so generous t hat 
disincentives, moral hazard, and receding social norms seriously distort the national 
economy, including the labor market. These risks seem to be particularly important in 
the case of unemployment benefits, support to single mothers, sick leave, disability 
pensions and early retirement. If disincentives and moral hazard undermine the 
financial viability of government-operated systems, and these would therefore have to 
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